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WRONGFUL DISCHARGE:
LITIGATION OR ARBITRATION?
Terry A. Bethel"

I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the country, courts are scrambling to fill the void left by the
rapid disappearance of the employment-at-will doctrine. As recently as twenty

years ago, most courts accepted without question the adage that employers were
free to terminate employees for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at alL1
If motivated to explain this rule, the most frequent defense was that employees

enjoyed comparable freedom. They, too, could abandon the relationship for
whatever reason they desired.
Although the pace of reform varies from state to state, there is no doubt that
the employment-at-will doctrine, in its classic form, is ailing. Discharged

employees now successfully sue their former employers using theories developed
under both tort and contract. The cases typically move through state courts and,
quite often we are told, result in large verdicts from sympathetic juries that are illequipped to intrude into the employer-employee relationship.2

The developing law has brought calls for regulation from at least two
quarters. First, those sympathetic to employee concerns have called for legislation
that broadens the scope of protection.'

Cases based on implied contract and

public policy exceptions are not always easy to prove, despite the success of some
plaintiffs. Perhaps more important is that such theories are more easily exploited
by managers and upper income employees, to date the principal source of
wrongful discharge plaintiffs, than they are by blue collar and unskilled workers.

* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of Law Bloomington. The authorexpresses his appreciationto his colleaguesKenneth Dau-Schmidt,Lynne
Henderson, andJulia Lamberfor their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. A complete review of the employment-at-will doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
Interesting and thorough discussions of the doctrine are available from many sources. See, e.g.,
Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L REV. 1404, 1416 (1967); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on the
Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REV. 855, 858 (1983);
Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. I.J. 1, 10 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Model Employment Termination Act, infra note 6, Prefatory Note, Background and
Summary, at 3-4.
3. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: An Idea Whose
Time Has Long Since Come, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FoUR.TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 43 (James L. Stem et aL eds., 1982).
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After some years of silence, organized labor has joined the call to extend
protection to ordinary working people.4
The other voice for regulation comes from those who worry that the
piecemeal advances of the courts vill create bad law. Included, no doubt, are
employer advocates who would b~aish employment law actions entirely. Of equal
concern is the ability of state courts to administer locally matters that have
national implications. For example, large employers with employees in more than
one state might face conflicting requirements, making it nearly impossible to
standardize employment policies firm-wide. Such concerns have prompted
suggestions for a national statute or for uniform state legislation. 5
One such effort is the Model Employment Termination Act [hereinafter
META], a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.6 META proposes a good cause termination standard for most employees7
and allows reinstatement and the recovery of lost wages as possible remedies. It
would allow neither compensatory nor punitive damages.' Especially significant
is META's proposal to remove civil courts from the enforcement arena
altogether.9 Convinced apparently by those who argue that juries have no place
in such disputes, META's drafters looked to arbitration for enforcement of its
provisions.10
META is not the only proposal to substitute arbitrators for juries in the
resolution of employment disputes. Arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements is, after all, probably the best example of a successful alternative
dispute resolution system. It is not surprising, then, that scholars and practitioners
alike have suggested that the success of labor arbitration can be duplicated in other
employment controversies as well."

4.

AFL-CIO EXcUTVE COUNCIL, ThE ENRLOYMENT-AT-WILL COUNCIL 44, 48 (1987).

5. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 519 (1976).
6.
Copies of META can be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago, Illinois, 60611. A full review
of META is beyond the scope of this article.

7. META, § 3(a).
8. META, § 7(b) lists the possible remedies.
9. The fmal draft contains an appendix that offers two alternatives, one that puts decision making
authority in the hands of state hearing officers and another which leaves enforcement to the courts.
Neither of these alternatives, however, is recommended by the drafters, who comment that "the
preferred method for enforcing the statutory protection against termination without good cause is
through the use of professional arbitrators .... " META, Comment to the Appendix.
10. See META, §§ 5, 6.
11.
See, e.g., Mary A. Bedikian, Transforming At-Will Employment Disputes into Wrongful
Discharge Claims: Fertile Groundfor ADR, 1993 J. DIsP. RES. 113, 141; Mary A. Bedikian,
Safeguardingthe Interests ofAt-Will Employees: A Model CaseforArbitration,1986 DET. C.L. REV.
1, 29; Alfred W. Blunrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration ofIndividualEmployment Disputes, 16
U. MIcH J.L. REF. 249; John C. O'Meara and Noel D. Massie, AlternativeDispute Resolution: Some
Employment Law Applications, 64 MIcK B.J. 1040, 1041 (1985); St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 57;
Summers, supra note 5, at 521.
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My purpose is not to attack those who would increase the employment
security of working men and women. Although I might disagree with particular
provisions, proposals like META are a welcome relief from the harshness of
employment-at-will, a doctrine that almost always favors the interests of employers
over those of employees. My concern, then, is not with the creation of substantive
rights, whether by statute, as META would have it, or by common law. Rather,
my interest is an examination of the unquestioned assumption that arbitrators are
better suited than judges or juries12 to resolve such matters.
Even here my argument is not that arbitrators should be excluded from the
fray altogether. I agree with some of the claims made about the utility of
arbitration in the administration of a collective bargaining relationship. My
question is whether the expertise of arbitrators in that setting - if expertise there
is - can easily be transferred to other forms of employment litigation. The
working assumption is that the virtues of labor arbitration will appear with equal
rectitude in wrongful discharge cases. Those assumptions, however, should not
be accepted without close examination.

II. THE ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION
Advocates for arbitration usually claim three principal advantages.
Arbitration, they say, is faster than ordinary litigation, it is less expensive, and,
unlike judges and juries, arbitrators have more experience in workplace disputes,
and therefore, bring considerable expertise to the task. All three factors are cited

in the introduction to META: "[Arbitration] should provide much speedier, more
informal, more expert, and less expensive proceedings." 3 My primary concern
is the allegation of arbitrator expertise. Nonetheless, the claims made for speed
and expense also bear examination. Because most of the strengths claimed for
arbitration are based on our experience with labor arbitration, it is worthwhile to
review briefly some of its legal framework.

A. Labor Arbitration
Although arbitration is not confined to the adjudication of disputes arising
under collective bargaining agreements, it is most frequently, and probably most
successfully, used in that arena. Not surprisingly, participants sometimes grumble
about arbitration decisions, just as litigants do in other forums. Nevertheless, labor
arbitration has become a successful, some would say indispensable, part of our

12. I do not mean this article to be a defense of the jury system. But it is not necessarily true
that juries must be included in wrongful discharge litigation under every theory. In particular, since

such remedies as reinstatement and back pay are ordinarily viewed as equitable innature, cases seeking
such relief under a statutory scheme might be tried to the court alone. In addition, a limitation on
punitive damages could remove some of the incentive to demand trial by jury.

13.

See META, Prefatory Note, at 5.
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system of collective bargaining. Despite occasional notes of discord, labor
arbitration enjoys wide acceptanceby both labor and management and, at least as
a formal matter, by the courts. 4
By "labor arbitration," I mean the system of resolving disputes that arise
concerningthe implementation or application of collective bargaining agreements.
By contrast, I refer to arbitration of employment termination claims outside
collective bargaining relationships as "wrongful discharge arbitration." Not
infrequently, labor arbitration cases concern whether an employee's discharge was
for proper cause.
The favored status of labor arbitration under law can be traced to a series of
Supreme Court decisions that began in 1957. In Textile Workers Union vs.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama,' the Court interpreted Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, which states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
• . .or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any -

district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.' 6
Justice Douglas, who figured prominently in arbitration's ascension to
preeminence, interpreted Section 301 not merely as jurisdictional, but as a grant
of substantive law:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quidpro quo

for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does
more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor
organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should
enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and
that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.' 7
In effect, the Court read the Act to authorize judicial creation of a federal common
law of labor contract enforcement, a common
law that was to be fashioned from
8
"the policy of our national labor laws."'
The first bit of that common law was fashioned by the Court in Lincoln Mills
itself: agreements to arbitrate contained in labor contracts were specifically

14.

Katherine
(1981).
15.
16.
17.
18.

See, e.g., PAUL R. HAYS, LABOR ARBrMAION:

A DsmuiNGO VIEW 117-18 (1966);

Van Wezel Stone, The Post War Paradigm inAmerican Labor Law, 90 YALM LJ. 1509
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
353 U.S. at 455.
Id at 456.
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enforceable. Although readily accepted today, that declaration was controversial
in 1957. Not only were agreements to arbitrate not enforceable at common law,
but there was a continuing dispute over whether the law had any role to play in
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 9
Subsequently, the now famous Steelworkers Trilogy," a series of cases
decided on the same day in 1960, allocated responsibilities between the arbitrator
and the courts, with arbitration clearly carrying the day. Except for the question
of who decides what is subject to arbitration, the courts are to play a limited role.
Even in those substantive arbitrability decisions, courts have little discretion.
Doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.
In the course of the Trilogy, Justice Douglas authored prose about arbitrators
that has become accepted lore. Douglas declared that an arbitrator "performs
functions which are not normal to courts" and functions which "may indeed be
foreign to the competence of courts." 2' Then, without citation to any authority,
Douglas asserted the peculiar competence of arbitrators in the resolution of
industrial disputes:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence
in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his
personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not
expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect
that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the
contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreementpermits,
such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its
consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions
will be heightened or diminished.. .. The ablest judge cannot be
expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the
determination
of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
22
informed.
Although occasionally subject to question or limitation,2 the Court has
generally adhered to the doctrine established in the Trilogy. In 1987, for example,

19. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspectsof the Labor Management Relations Ac4 61 HAv.
L. REV. 274 (1948); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 999 (1955).
20.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
21. 363 U.S. at 581.
22. Id at 582. Although he cited nothing to support his claims about arbitrators, Justice Douglas
appears to have been influenced by the writings of scholar-arbitrators Archibald Cox and Harry
Shulman. See generally Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482
(1959); Shulman, supra note 19, at 1016-24.
23. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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the Court again reminded the lower federal courts (which have been slow to
relinquish authority) of the paramount authority of labor arbitrators in the
settlement of contractual disputes under Section 301.24 Douglas' praise of
arbitration in general, and arbitrators in particular, has gained widespread
acceptance, especially among labor arbitrators, who are quick to assert the
exclusivity of their expertise. The occasional
dissenting voices, for the most part,
25
have been too shrill to be taken seriously.
Given the assumed competence of labor arbitration, and its declared
superiority over judicial litigation, it is not surprising that arbitration has been
proposed as a desirable alternative to resolution of other employment disputes.26
My purpose is not to assert that arbitration is inappropriate. I have some
experience both as advocate and as arbitrator and I respect what arbitration has
accomplished in the unionized sector. Nevertheless, I think it is important that we
not exaggerate the advantages of arbitration and the competence of arbitrators and
that we understand the differences between what we know as arbitration and what
has been proposed.
B. Expediency and Cost
Typically, proponents of arbitration claim three principal advantages for
arbitration of wrongful discharge cases: cost, speed, and competence. It is true
that labor arbitration is usually faster and less expensive than ordinary litigation.
Even the best and busiest of arbitrators can ordinarily schedule a hearing within
a few months of his or her selection. It is sometimes possible to arrange a date
within weeks. Indeed, some arbitration panels require that discharge cases be tried

24.
25.
26.

See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
See, e.g., HAYS, supranote 14, at 117-18.
cites
a number of advantages:
commentator
One notable
Adopting the arbitration format would immediately make available the vast body
of arbitral precedent that has been developed in countless decisions over the years.
It would permit the use of an established nucleus of experienced arbitrators ....
It would facilitate maximum flexibility ....
The relative informality and speed
of arbitration - though both those qualities are now often much eroded - should
also appeal to rank-and file-employees.
Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust DischargeReform Heads Toward Full Flower,
67 NEB. L REv. 56, 77-78 (1988).
27. META also asserts that arbitration is more informal than ordinary litigation. While there
is no reason to question that claim, it is not clear on its face that informality contributes to the
efficiency of arbitration. As I argue below, there is a significant difference between arbitration under
a collective bargaining agreement and commercial arbitration of other employment claims. Informality
may help foster the continuing relationship between employers and unions who are parties to a
collective bargaining agreement, but the same interest does not necessarily attend litigation between
individual employees and employers.

http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1993/iss2/2

6

1993]

Bethel: Bethel: Wrongful Discharge: Litigation or Arbitration
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

within two weeks of the termination.2" Nevertheless, one should be careful not
to overestimate the speed of the process.
Recent statistics compiled by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) indicate that in the 1991 fiscal year, the average arbitration case
administered by that agency took 364.86 days from grievance filing to award.29
Some would argue that even this is fairly expedient, as compared to the
overburdened court dockets in such places as New York City and Chicago. But
there is no reason to believe that large cities will host most of the employment
litigation or that all communities suffer similar inefficiencies. For example, in
Monroe County, Indiana, with a population of about 100,000, the average civil
case filed in Superior Court, in roughly the same time period that produced the
FMCS data mentioned above, took an average of 5.3 months from filing to
disposition.3"
This data, of course, does not include appeals, which could add appreciably
to the length of the litigation. Although labor arbitration is typically not burdened
with appeals, the policy arguments supporting the finality of a labor arbitrator's
award cannot be made with equal force for other types of employment litigation,
as I will argue in more detail below. Thus, one should expect that, unlike labor
arbitration, the arbitrator's decision in a wrongful discharge case will not
necessarily end the proceedings.
It is also true that parties to a labor arbitration often incur less cost than
litigants in other forums. The parties are often not represented by counsel, thus
obviating the need to pay attorney fees. Court reporters are typically not used and,
for the most part, there are no posthearing procedures except for briefs. Although
the arbitrator charges a fee, most cases can be resolved for fees of under $2000."
The speed with which the process works and the amount it costs are also
related. It is doubtful that lawyers trying labor arbitration cases charge
appreciably less for their time in that forum than they do for other types of
proceedings. However, they may spend less time on arbitration cases because
there is no significant discovery, there are fewer motions to argue, and less time

28. The time differences between arbitration and ordinary litigation should not be exaggerated.
One of the more frequent complaints encountered from unions and employers is the delay that
sometimes accompanies scheduling hearings. In addition, the parties sometimes complain about the
time lag between the hearing and the arbitrator's award.
The average was 112.30 days from the time of the grievance until a panel request to the
29.
agency and an additional 252.56 days from the panel request to the award. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND
CONCILIATION SERVICE, ARBITRATION STATISTICS FISCAL 1991, at 1 (1991).

30. Telephone interview with Victoria Thevenow, Administrator of the Monroe County, Indiana,
Circuit Court, November 20, 1991. On July 22, 1991, Ms. Thevenow completed a study of all civil
litigation in Monroe County (excluding small claims cases) filed over the previous year. The average
of 5.3 months includes jury cases, in which there was a decision shortly after the trial, and judge tried
cases, in which there was a time lag between the close of the trial and the decision.
In 1991, the average total fee for an arbitration administered by the Federal Mediation and
31.
Conciliation Service was $1975.82. FMCS ARBITRATION STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 1. A statute
authorizing arbitration might also provide that the arbitrator's fees will be paid by the state or by some
form of insurance funded by employers.
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is spent contesting the other side's evidence. Moreover, prehearing briefs are
uncommon. These features could also accompany arbitration of a wrongful
discharge action. One should recognize, however, that such an arbitration is not
labor arbitration as we know it. As such, the body of law developed under
Section 301 does not apply.
Section 301 provides for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. While a wrongful discharge action may be predicated on a contract
theory, there are no collective bargaining agreements at issue. An agreement to
arbitrate such a dispute, then, is not labor arbitration, but is ordinary commercial
arbitration, conducted most likely under a state's version of the Uniform
Arbitration Act. 2 That distinction may be more important than some
commentators have pretended.
Certainly, commercial arbitration can be more expedient and more
inexpensive than the litigation it replaces. Those advantages, however, should not
be exaggerated. Part of the savings in labor arbitration is attributable to the
absence of attorneys in some, perhaps most, proceedings. Except in extraordinary
circumstances, one should expect that in wrongful discharge litigation, both sides
will be represented by counsel no matter what the forum.
Even when attorneys are present in labor arbitration, parties to mature
collective bargaining relationships often develop shared understandings or, at the
least, possess common knowledge that expedites the hearing. A union attorney
who regularly represents grievants in arbitrations with Company X, for example,
is no doubt familiar with the company's organizational structure and may know
enough about the business to understand what has happened and why. That
familiarity may well be lacking for the plaintiff's attorney, not versed in industrial
lore and jargon, who sues Company X in a wrongful discharge case. That
unfamiliarity also points to another potential problem.
There is no formal discovery in labor arbitration. That does not mean that
the parties try cases by ambush. In the first place, union attorneys (or
representatives) have easy access to employee-members, who furnish valuable
information about the employer. More important, the National Labor Relations
Act mandates that employers furnish to the union relevant information that will
assist it in the collective bargaining process.33 Since arbitration is considered to
be part of the process of collective bargaining, unions are at least entitled to
information basic to the hearing.14 Moreover, some collective bargaining
agreements provide access to employee personnel files and to other pertinent
information. Although probably not as extensive as formal discovery, these
procedures allow the parties to gain some familiarity with the other side's case
prior to the hearing.

32. META provides expressly that the state's Uniform Arbitration Act "applies to proceedings
under [META] as if the parties had agreed to arbitrate under that statute." See META, § 6(a).
33. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
34. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. "432 (1967).
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An individual litigant who chooses arbitration for her wrongful discharge
claim has no such advantage. The Uniform Arbitration Act does not provide for
discovery. Further, the National Labor Relations Act does not apply. The only
right to information will be that contained in the arbitration agreement made by
the parties or in the applicable state law, if any. META, for example, provides
that "all forms of discovery... are available in the discretion of the arbitrator,"
who is cautioned to avoid "undue delay, expense, or inconvenience."35 Even in
the absence of statute, one should assume that arbitration of a wrongful discharge
action will include some form of discovery. Although not commonly employed
in labor arbitration, where speed is considered important, discovery is neither
illegal nor unnatural in arbitration. Presumably, plaintiffs' lawyers would want
some right to inquire into the other side's case.36
Lawyers who have not litigated with a particular employer before will
undoubtedly be less familiar with the company than are union lawyers and less
able to understand the discharge in context. And, while a plaintiff's lawyer can
learn something from other employees friendly with the plaintiff (if any), those
employees are under less pressure to cooperate than are fellow union members.
Moreover, without the protection of a union, other employees may fear retaliation
if their cooperation is too overt.
In the absence of META or comparable legislation, plaintiffs' attorneys may
want to negotiate a right to interview or depose company officials, to discover
documents, and to submit interrogatories.37 None of this is objectionable in its
own right. Indeed, some of it may be essential, especially in cases in which a
plaintiff claims discrimination based on disparate treatment. Whatever inherent
advantages arbitration may hold can be easily outweighed when a plaintiff
attempts to try the case without discovery. It is important to remember, however,
that time spent on discovery will not only increase the expense, it will also delay
the hearing. The litigation backlog is not due solely to overworked judges.
Lawyers need some time to take depositions, discover documents, exchange
interrogatories, and, in general, understand their law suit.
In labor arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, the continuing
relationship may shortcut some of these problems. Parties who deal with each
other on a regular basis may be willing to disclose information requested by the
other side without significant formal proceedings. But those same advantages may
well not attend a commercial arbitration over a wrongful discharge. In summary,
although arbitration of a wrongful discharge action may be faster and less
expensive than ordinary litigation, one should be cautious about the comparison

35. META, § 6(c).
36. The comment to Section 6(c) of META observes that "discovery ought to be limited to what
is reasonably necessary to enable both parties to prepare adequately."
37. Presumably, plaintiffs' counsel will have some considerable leverage to win such concessions
since, in the absence of statute, the alternative is ordinary litigation which is attended by the full range
of civil discovery.
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to labor arbitration. If the arbitration is to operate efficiently, the advantages of
speed and expense are likely to be muted.
C. The Arbitrator
Perhaps the most heralded advantage of arbitration over ordinary litigation
is the special competence of the arbitrator. Seldom has so much collective
wisdom been attributed to any class of people. Echoing Justice Douglas' claims
in the Steelworkers Trilogy, scholars have seemingly accepted the conventional
wisdom that employment disputes are better resolved by arbitrators than by judges
and juries. 8 Whether arbitrators are better able than judges to resolve disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements is a question that has not been
thoroughly examined. Most scholars - many of whom are arbitrators themselves
- exhort the arbitrator's expertise without any significant empirical evaluation of
what arbitrators do or any meaningful comparison to other litigation forms.39
Whether labor arbitrators are better or worse than judges, however, is not the
issue. Again, arbitration of wrongful discharge claims is not labor arbitration.
Justice Douglas' flattering description of arbitrators was not merely an assertion
that arbitrators are better decision makers than judges. Rather, he was describing
how arbitration functions as part of the collective bargaining system. 40 At its
base, labor arbitration is nothing more than a way to solve disputes about what
collective bargaining agreements mean. One notable scholar has asserted that the

38. In the Comment to the Appendix, META justifies its preference for arbitration over judicial
litigation by asserting that arbitrators "have the requisite skill, training, and experience to understand
The work of some scholars echoes Justice Douglas'
the special problems of the workplace ....
undocumented assertions in the Steelworkers Trilogy. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Mennemeier, Protection
from Unjust Discharge: An ArbitrationScheme, 19 HARm J. ON LEGcs. 49, 75 (1982):
With the passage of time, arbitrators acquire experience at resolving a variety of labor
disputes. They become acquainted with the particular needs and interests of specific
bodies of employees and employers. They also gain familiarity with employment
practices within a certain industry, field, or geographic region. This accumulated
experience enables arbitrators to approach employment disputes from a unique and highly
advantageous perspective.
Mennemeier's principal source of authority for this endorsement of arbitrator competence is Justice
Douglas' opinion in Warrior& GulfNavigation. Id at 75 n. 104. The same author asserts that judges
lack the necessary expertise and perspective to deal with employment issues. Id at 66.
39.
See, e.g., Heinsz, supra note 1, at 889-90. Heinsz recommends arbitration of wrongful
discharge claims, asserting that "[t]here is a ready source of labor arbitrators who are experts in
balancing employees' rights and management interests." Id at 890. In support of his claim of arbitral
expertise, Heinsz, himself a prominent scholar-arbitrator, cites only the passage from Justice Douglas,
quoted above (see supra text accompanying note 22). See Heinz, supra note 1, at 890 n.210.
40. Justice Douglas noted that "the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily
to further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement
serve their specialized needs." See Warrior & GulfNavigation,363 U.S. at 582.
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arbitrator should merely be viewed as the contract reader.4' As such, arbitrators'
decisions are neither right nor wrong. They are simply what the contract says.
It is no doubt true that decision makers so intimately involved in contract
administration would benefit from knowledge of plant customs, practices, and
operations. They might also benefit from industry trends and traditions. Whether
arbitrators actually have this knowledge and, perhaps more important, whetherthey
know how to use it if they do, is debatable. The deference to arbitral authority
that resulted from the Supreme Court's praise may be well vested in experienced
arbitrators like Richard Mittenthal and Theodore St. Antoine, but the same
presumptions apply no matter how competent - or incompetent - the arbitrator.
One need only see the deference given to the unusual arbitration award in Misco,
the Court's support
Inc. v. PaperworkersInternationalUnion42 to understand that
43
for arbitration has little to do with the arbitrator's ability.
Even if an understanding of the common law of the shop is important in
labor arbitration, it is not clear that such an understanding plays any significant
role in wrongful discharge litigation. Labor arbitrators, at least if the conventional
wisdom is true, preserve the collective bargaining relationship and furnish a
valuable alternative to strikes. There is, though, no collective bargaining
relationship to preserve in wrongful discharge litigation, nor is there any realistic

possibility of a strike. Rather, the arbitration is merely a substitute for litigation.
One must ask, then, why arbitration is better.
Certainly it is not better because arbitrators are superior decision makers.
Judges exist to resolve disputes. While some arbitrators are busy and decide one
hundred or more cases per year, most have a much more modest case load.
Indeed, a great majority of arbitrators hear relatively few cases each year." It
is no doubt the case that the average trial judge has more experience listening to
testimony, making credibility determinations, and resolving factual disputes than
the average arbitrator.
There is, however, Justice Douglas' commonly believed assumption that
arbitrators are more skilled than judges in resolving employment disputes, an

41. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, JudicialReviewofArbitration Awards, 75 MICH L. REV. 1137
(1977).
42. 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). For a more comprehensive review of the arbitrator's opinion, see
Misco, Inc. v. United PaperworkersInt'7 Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. There are reporting services that publish arbitration awards which allow some insight into
an arbitrator's abilities. It is dangerous, however, to place much reliance on published awards.
Arbitrators do not submit all of their awards for publication consideration and only a fraction of those
submitted are actually published. There is no reason to assume that the awards published for a
particular arbitrator are representative of that arbitrator's work or knowledge. Moreover, some of the
commercial services are more concerned with arbitrators' bias rather than with their competence.
44.
1991 statistics from FMCS indicate that of the 1097 arbitrators who decided cases
administered by that agency in 1991, 780 arbitrators heard fewer than five cases. Over 300 heard only
one case. Only 10 decided 26 o? more cases. See FMCS, supranote 29, at 3. The figures are similar
for the American Arbitration Association, the other principal source of ad hoc arbitrator appointments.
It is no doubt true that arbitrators get more work from permanent panels than they do from the A.ALA.
or FMCS, but inexperienced arbitrators are not likely to be included on panels.
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environment to which judges have little exposure. This claim would be more
difficult to answer if one could be confident that all - or even most - arbitrators
had significant experience. Even if they do, it is not clear how much that
exposure is worth in wrongful discharge litigation.
Judges may have little personal experience in, or familiarity with, the
industrial arena. However, judges are not expert in most of the areas in which
they are called upon to decide cases. They know little about medicine, but they
decide malpractice cases and other claims involving medical and scientific
evidence. And most are not experts in economics, but they decide antitrust and
other business disputes worth millions of dollars. It is just not fair to claim that
judges are not able to adequately address the issues raised in employment
litigation. They are, for the most part; experienced decision makers who are able
to resolve factual disputes competently presented to them.
Arbitrators, of course, can do this too. And it may be that familiarity with
industrial practice will aid the decision or, conceivably, shorten the hearing. That
is, experienced arbitrators may require less evidence about industry practice or
environment than a judge. But that assumes that parties are able to identify
arbitrators who have such special knowledge, an assumption not warranted in
every case. Despite Douglas' claim regarding arbitral expertise, it is most likely
that most arbitratots are chosen not for their wisdom, but for their bias.
In short, the arbitrator's special competence, if it exists, relates to
preservation of the collective bargaining relationship. Arbitrators are supposed to
understand that the case they hear is but one chapter in a continuing relationship
between employer, employee, and union, and that, to some extent, the relationship
(and the union's responsibility in it) may transcend individual rights. Those
interests, which certainly warrant protection, are not present in litigation over
wrongful discharge in a nonunion work place.
But, we are told, the basic decision in wrongful discharge cases is whether
an employee was fired for just cause. Arbitrators, the argument goes, are experts
in just cause,45 a concept they helped develop and, some assert, only they
understand. One commentator, indeed, claims that since most arbitration awards
are not published, the meaning of just cause is not known to (and presumably
cannot be discovered by) any but the initiated - i.e., the arbitrators. He did not
explain how new arbitrators acquire this mysterious insight. 6
I do not mean to belittle the experience of arbitrators in making just cause
determinations. Some arbitrators have applied the concept to a myriad of
situations and there is an industrial lore about what conduct will or will not
warrant discharge. One must remember, however, that just cause is ordinarily
applied in continuing relationships, often when there is some express or implied

45. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 57-58, where the author asserts that "arbitration is the
superior method for 'just cause' determinations. Adopting the arbitration format would immediately
make available the vast body of substance and procedure that has been developed in countless decisions
over the years."
46. See Mennemeier, supra note 38, at 76.
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guarantee of equal treatment. A principal inquiry in many arbitrations is how the
employer has treated similarly situated employees in the past. Nonunion
employers, in particular, may not wish to be saddled with previous sins or
omissions and could, therefore, be reluctant to entrust a decision to someone for
whom a principal inquiry will be what has happened before.
One must also question whether just cause, as developed by labor arbitrators,
will have much practical application in wrongful discharge litigation. For the most
part, arbitrators work in blue collar industries, the traditional stronghold of
organized labor. There are, certainly, organized white collar employees, especially
in state and local government. It is rare, however, to encounter in a collective
bargaining unit an executive or a highly-paid employee who has significant
discretion. Yet those are just the people who are most likely to become wrongful
discharge plaintiffs. This ,rea of the law, at least as of now, holds little promise
for blue collar workers who are unlikely to have the same kinds of assurances of

continued employment as executives.47 Moreover, their potential recoveries may
not be substantial enough to attract even the more altruistic of the plaintiffs'
bar.

Although managers and executives are the most likely plaintiffs, the industrial
concept of just cause is not easily adapted to their cases. Just cause, as we know
it, is heavily steeped in the treatment afforded similarly situated employees and in
insubordination. Those concepts may mean little in the termination of an
executive, where decision makers may face difficult questions of abuse of
discretion, range of acceptable performance, or managerial ability." Executive

47. One of the goals of META is to broaden the range of employees who enjoy protection from
wrongful discharge. Thus, its good cause standard applies to most employees. See META § 3(a).
Equally important, META allows the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, which should
increase the willingness of attorneys to represent discharged employees whose cases are unlikely to
produce attractive contingent fees. See META, §§ 7(b), 7(c). To date, META has not been enacted
in any jurisdiction. Although the provision for attorney's fees is attractive, one might expect that
Moreover, plaintiffs' attorney
employer interests will lobby against it in state legislatures.
organizations are sure to argue for a continuation of the contingent fee contracts and compensatory and
punitive damages that have made representation of management employees so lucrative. See, e.g.,
William L Mauk, Safeguardingthe Workplace, Model Employment TerminationAct isFlawed,TRIAL,
June 1991, at 28. (TRIAL is published by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, commonly
identified with the plaintiffs' bar.) The point is that while META promises reform, one must be
cautious in predicting that wrongful discharge remedies will become available to a wider range of
employees.
48. At least one court has recognized this problem. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), the court considered the claim of a discharged executive who asserted,
among other things, that he worked under an implied contract that allowed discharge only for "just
cause" or "good cause." The court discussed the difficulty of defining those concepts and then said
"care must be taken, however, not to interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion.
.. . [Wihere, as here, the employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the
employer must of necessity be allowed substantial scope in the exercise of subjective judgment" Id
at 928. With respect to standards developed by labor arbitrators, the court observed that:
[S]ome of their work may be useful. It must be remembered, however, that [labor]
arbitrators are selected by the parties and on the basis, partly, of the confidence which the
parties have in their knowledge and judgment concerning labor relations matters [citing
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responsibilities are more difficult to quantify than those attending typical blue
collar employment and even an experienced arbitrator may find that his
background is of little use. 9

These differences between labor arbitration and wrongful discharge
arbitration also raise questions about the applicability of another of labor
arbitration's guiding principles. The judiciary's limited role in labor arbitration
extends not only to the determination of the case in the first instance, but to postaward proceedings as well. Although there is some reason to question whether
appellate courts have accepted the Supreme Court's pronouncements, the Trilogy
excluded the courts from any. substantial role in the review of arbitrators'
decisions.50 Generally, review is limited to whether the arbitrator displayed
partiality, exceeded his jurisdiction, or violated public policy.
As I have already argued, one might legitimately question whether labor
arbitrators are blessed with the wisdom attributed to them by Justice Douglas.
Even if they are, however, it is not their ability that shelters awards from review.
In no other form of litigation, at least, can one argue that decisions should be final
because the decision maker is smart. The justification for limiting awards from
review resides not in the assumed competence of the arbitrators, but in the nature
of the process.
Although some of the conventional wisdom about arbitration may be more
folklore than fact, one thing Justice Douglas said is true: labor arbitration is a
substitute for industrial strife. The avoidance of conflict may not be the only
motivation of employers and unions, but arbitration has the effect of channeling
into a peaceful forum disputes that might otherwise erupt into strikes or economic
action. 5 Unions, in fact, typically waive the right of employees to strike over
grievances in favor of an agreement to arbitrate contract disputes.
The finality of awards is a necessary feature of this process. It is one thing
for employees to defer economic action in favor of a procedure that takes a few
months. It is quite another to demand patience while appeals meander through the
courts. A principal virtue of arbitration, then, is not necessarily that it reaches the
right result, or that the arbitrators are blessed with some mystical insight. Rather,
the advantage of the system is that it identifies problems that are likely sources of

Warrior & Gulf Navigation]. For courts to apply the same standards may prove overly
intrusive in some cases.
Id.at 928 n.26.
49. Even experienced arbitrators, however, overlook these differences. In a recent speech to the
National Academy of Arbitrators, arbitrator Stephen Hayford reviewed the "competencies" that will be
required of arbitrators who hear cases based on wrongful discharge statutes like META. Among the
skills needed, Hayford claims, is the ability to apply the "common law of the shop" to discipline in
nonunion workplaces. His entire analysis of arbitrator competence in this area is as follows: "No
problem here." See Stephen L Hayford, The Changing Character of Labor Arbitration, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FoRTY-FnI ANNUAL ME nNG OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrTRATORS
69, 84-86 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1993).
50. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
51.
It is just this feature of arbitration that has prompted criticism from critical legal studies
scholars. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 14.
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conflict and resolves them in a expeditious manner. Appeals are preempted not
because the arbitrator is likely to be right, but because a delay in resolution might
weaken the resolve of unions and employees to defer other action. Moreover,
significant delay and an inability to resolve disputes expeditiously might
undermine the continuing relationship between employer and union.
One should question whether finality will or should be a necessary feature of
arbitration under statutory schemes or private submission agreements. In the
typical case, there will be no threat of concerted action by employees and there is
no union-employerrelationship to protect. Moreover, wrongful discharge litigation
will not merely involve construction of a privately negotiated agreement. Instead,
the decision maker may be required to interpret statutory or common law rights,
matters that are ordinarily thought to be beyond the competence (or at least the
jurisdiction) of labor arbitrators. Finally, unlike labor arbitrations, an arbitrator's
decision in a wrongful discharge case cannot be negotiated away in the next round
of collective bargaining.
Although the META drafters opine that courts should accord deference to
arbitrators' decisions in proceedings conducted under the statute, the model
legislation itself includes the possibility of more expanded judicial review than is
available in labor arbitration.52 In states that have not adopted META, employers
may be reluctant to agree to arbitration without some assurance that an arbitrator's
decision can be reviewed.. The point is that either because of differences in policy
or by statute, wrongful discharge litigation is more likely to lead to judicial review
than has typically been the case with labor arbitration. That will not only lengthen
the proceedings, but make them more expensive as well.
1H. SUMMARY
This article is not a brief against the use of arbitration to resolve wrongful
discharge disputes. There may well be some advantages. As noted, arbitration
could be faster and less expensive. Since the parties can shape the proceeding by
contract, it might be more informal and less acrimonious than other forms of
litigation. And, not to be ignored, an arbitrator might be vested with more
remedial authority than judges, who are typically confined to an award of
damages. From the employer's perspective, arbitration might be a way to avoid
punitive damages since, unless the parties so agree (or a statute allows), the
arbitrator will have no authority to award them. Finally (although this is not an
exclusive list), unlike ordinary litigation, an arbitration could be private, perhaps

52.

Section 8(c) provides that an arbitrator's award can be vacated or modified in cases of fraud,

corruption, evident partiality, or exercise of excess power. All of these are grounds commonly asserted
to vacate labor arbitrators' awards as well. META, however, also allows an arbitrator's award to be
set aside where "the arbitrator committed a prejudicial error of law." The comment to Section 8 notes
that this addition was necessary because the arbitrator is construing statutory, and not just contract,

rights.
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a significant consideration in cases involving confidential business information or
allegations of embarrassing personal conduct.
Those advantages may outweigh the disadvantages. My real purpose is not
to discourage the use of arbitration, but to caution potential litigants that
arbitration is not paradise, despite its enthusiastic endorsement by scholars, most
of whom are arbitrators themselves. Although labor arbitration has its virtues,
they are not necessarily adaptable to all other forms of litigation, even if the
dispute arose in the work place. Wrongful discharge arbitration is likely to cost
more than labor arbitration and to take longer. Most important, the presumed
expertise of labor arbitrators, questionable enough in their home forum, is not
readily transferable to other kinds of employment litigation.
This does not mean that employers and employees should shun arbitration.
Some labor arbitrators are experienced decision makers who could work
effectively in any forum. However, I do suggest that arbitration offers less in the
resolution of wrongful discharge disputes than its supporters have promised.
Moreover, judges are not nearly as inept as arbitration's advocates have portrayed
them. In particular, there is no reason to assume that arbitrators possess any more
insight than judges or that they have any magic solutions to difficult problems.
Labor arbitrators are an important cog in a system that has served well the
interests of those who are party to a collective bargaining agreement. But it is
folly to assume that the system works because of the arbitrator's skill. Rather, it
works because there is no reasonable alternative. The institutional characteristics
that make arbitration attractive in the unionized sector, however, are not present
in wrongful discharge litigation. That does not mean that arbitration is unsuitable
for wrongful discharge cases; it does mean that, unlike labor arbitration, there is
an alternative. In their haste to promote the use of arbitration, its advocates have
unfairly disparaged the ability of courts to resolve workplace disputes and have
exaggerated the utility of arbitration and the ability of arbitrators.
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